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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mr. Baker pled guilty to two felony counts. For one, he did so via an Alford plea. 1 
These were his first felony convictions, and he had been a relatively stable, law-abiding 
citizen for most of his adult life. He was amenable to treatment and he accepted 
responsibility for his actions. However, because he decided to plead to one count via 
Alford, the district court imposed a prison sentence instead of retaining jurisdiction, as 
the presentence investigator had recommended. In doing so, the district court abused 
its discretion and imposed excessive sentences. This Court should remedy that abuse. 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
Pursuant to a non-binding plea agreement, Mr. Baker pled guilty to two counts of 
criminal conduct (Count I, sexual battery of a minor who is sixteen or seventeen 
years old and Count II, attempted rape). (R., pp.42-43 and Tr., p.10, L.2 - p.12, L.23.) 
In exchange, the State agreed to drop Count III. (Tr., p.5, Ls.15-16.) In doing so, 
Mr. Baker maintained that he was innocent as to Count I, but recognized that the State 
could present sufficient evidence to gain a conviction, and so pled guilty via an Alford 
plea in regard to Count I. (Tr., p.10, L.2 - p.11, L.21.) Specifically, he contended 
that he had never touched the victim's breasts during their encounter.2 (Tr., p.10, 
1 A plea made pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970), whereby the 
defendant is permitted to not admit guilt, but still take advantage of a plea agreement if 
he believes the state would likely obtain a conviction at trial. 
2 The State charged the offense as "[Mr. Baker] . . . did commit Sexual Battery by 
having sexual contact with K.S.N. a child of sixteen or seventeen years of age, to-wit: 
16 years old by touching her breasts .... " (R., p.43.) 
1 
L.13 - p.11, L.1.) The district court, despite its distaste for Alford pleas in sex cases, 
accepted both guilty pleas as they were offered. (R., p.63; Tr., p.13, Ls.1-5.) 
These were Mr. Baker's first felony charges. (Presentence Investigation Report 
(hereinafter, PSI), pp.4-5l Otherwise, his criminal record only consisted of three 
misdemeanors, one probation/parole violation, and six traffic infractions. (PSI, p.5.) He 
had also been fairly stable, working some thirteen years for the same employer before a 
lack of business forced the company to lay him off. (PSI, 9.) During his pretrial and 
presentencing release, Mr. Baker was on time for his appointments and court dates. 
(Tr., p.26, L.24 - p.27, L.3; PSI, p.49.) He cooperated with the presentence 
examinations and was truthful on his polygraph. (PSI, pp.32, 37.) He scored a 2 of 12 
on his STATIC-99 examination, which placed him in a low-moderate risk to reoffend 
category. (PSI, p.38.) He accepted responsibility for his actions, even though he was 
unable to effectively communicate that to the presentence investigator. (Tr., p.19, 
Ls.12-19 and PSI, p.13.) He was also amenable to treatment.4 Ultimately, the 
presentence investigator recommended that the district court retain jurisdiction and 
3 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file "Sealed 
Charles leo Baker.pdf." Included in this file is the PSI report as well as all the 
documents attached thereto (i.e., police reports, psychological evaluations). 
4 There is a difference of opinion as to Mr. Baker's amenability to treatment between 
the doctors who performed his psychological/psychosexual examination and the 
neuropsychological examination. As part of his psychological/psychosexual 
examination, Dr. Paul Wert made a general diagnosis of dementia resulting from head 
trauma Mr. Baker received as an adolescent. (PSI, p.38.) As a result of these 
observations, Dr. Wert concluded that Mr. Baker would not significantly benefit from 
rehabilitative treatment. (PSI, p.38.) Subsequently, Mr. Baker consulted Dr. John Wolfe 
to perform specific tests designed to diagnose dementia and its affect on his amenability 
to treatment. (See generally PSI, pp.49-57.) Dr. Wolfe determined that the diagnosis of 
dementia was inaccurate and that Mr. Baker's condition was more properly classified as 
a "cognitive disorder, [not otherwise specified] NOS, secondary to brain injury." (PSI, 
p.56.) In light of this more accurate diagnosis, Dr. Wolfe concluded that Mr. Baker could 
receive a benefit from rehabilitative opportunities, provided some accommodations were 
made for him. 
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recommend Mr. Baker participate in the Traditional Retained Jurisdiction Program. 
(PSI, p.13.) 
The district court, however, decided to impose a prison sentence. (R., pp.B9-91.) 
Its reason for imposing a prison sentence was, in its own words, "I am doing that in 
consideration of the fact that you entered an Alford plea .... " (Tr., p.32, Ls.7-B.) To 
that end, it imposed two concurrent unified sentences of ten years, with two years fixed. 
(R., pp.B9-91.) 
Mr. Baker timely appealed from that judgment. (R., p.92.) 
3 
ISSUES 
1. Whether the district court imposed a vindictive sentence after Mr. Baker 
exercised his right to enter an Alford plea. 
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion when it imposed concurrent 
unified sentences of ten years, with two years fixed, upon Mr. Baker following his 
plea of guilty to sexual battery of a minor, who is sixteen or seventeen years old, 




The District Court Imposed A Vindictive Sentence After Mr. Baker Exercised His Right 
To Enter An Alford Plea 
A. Introduction 
The district court imposed a vindictive sentence in this case, based on the fact 
that Mr. Baker had entered an Alford plea. And while Mr. Baker did not object at trial, 
this Court is able to review the issue as fundamental error, pursuant to State v. Perry, 
150 Idaho 209, 226 (2010), reh'g denied. To show fundamental error, the defendant 
must demonstrate that the alleged error: "(1) violates one or more of the defendant's 
unwaived constitutional rights; (2) the error is clear or obvious without the need for 
reference to any additional information not contained in the appellate record; and 
(3) the error affected the outcome of the trial proceedings." Perry, 150 Idaho at 228; 
State v. Corbus, 151 Idaho 368,371 (Ct. App. 2011), rev. denied. The record in this 
case demonstrates that the imposition of sentence was a fundamental error under the 
Perry test. 
B. The Sentence Was Imposed In Violation Of Mr. Baker's Unwaived Constitutional 
Due Process Rights 
Even before its decision in Perry, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that "right 
to be free from vindictive sentencing" constitutes a fundamental error that can be 
reviewed for the first time on appeal, "because it would go to the foundation or basis of 
[the defendant's] rights." State v. Robbins, 123 Idaho 527, 530 (1993). In particular, the 
United States Supreme Court has recognized that a vindictive sentence imposed in 
response to the defendant's exercise of one of his rights (such as the right to have a 
5 
trial or to appeal) during the proceedings violates the constitutional protections of due 
process, as provided by the Fourteenth Amendment. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 
U.S. 711, 723-24 (1969), overruled on other grounds by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 
794 (1989); State v. Regester, 106 Idaho 296,298 (Ct. App. 1984). The Idaho Court of 
Appeals has recently recognized a distinction in this regard - particularly that the 
presumption of vindictiveness established in Pearce only applies when the defendant is 
alleging he received a vindictive sentence following a successful challenge to his 
sentence, but not when he challenges his initial sentence as vindictively imposed. 
State v. Grist, _ Idaho _, February 24, 2012 Opinion at 5 (Ct. App. 2012), petition 
for review filed, (distinguishing Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 and Regester, 106 Idaho at 298). 
In such cases where the presumption does not apply, the defendant must demonstrate 
the vindictiveness from the record. Regester, 106 Idaho at 299; Robbins, 123 Idaho at 
532. Mr. Baker recognizes that the presumption does not apply in his case since he is 
challenging the initial sentencing determination, not a subsequent determination 
following a successful challenge to his sentence. See Grist, _ Idaho _, 
February 24, 2012 Opinion at 5. Therefore, to meet this prong of the Perry fundamental 
error test, Mr. Baker must demonstrate that the district court imposed a vindictive 
sentence based upon the exercise of one of his rights. 
The record is clear that the district court's decision to impose sentence, as 
opposed to retaining jurisdiction (as was recommended by the presentence investigator 
(PSI, p.13)), was "in consideration of the fact that [Mr. Baker] entered an Alford 
plea .... " (Tr., p.32, Ls.7-8.) Mr. Baker had the right to invoke an Alford plea because, 
as the United States Supreme Court has held, declaration of guilt is not a constitutional 
requirement in regard to guilty pleas. Alford, 400 U.S. at 37. Therefore, it permits 
6 
defendants to plead guilty without admitting guilt. 5 The purpose of such pleas is to 
put an end to the matter. See State v. Jones, 129 Idaho 471, 474 (Ct. App. 1996). 
Mr. Baker recognized that, based on the evidence it had, the State was more than likely 
to meet its burden of proof and ultimately get a conviction. (Tr., p.10, L.18 - p.11, L.19.) 
Therefore, rather than go through a trial, he decided to enter a knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary guilty plea, despite maintaining his innocence, in order to more efficiently 
resolve the matter. (See Tr., pp.10-11.) His decision to pursue this course was within 
his rights. See Alford, 400 U.S. at 37; Howry, 127 Idaho at 96. 
As a result, the district court's decision to impose a prison sentence "in 
consideration of the fact that [Mr. Baker] entered an Alford plea" (Tr., p.32, Ls.7-8), 
demonstrates the vindictiveness in sentencing. Compare Regester, 106 Idaho at 299. 
As such, the sentence violated Mr. Baker's unwaived constitutional right to due process. 
See Alford, 400 U.S. at 37. Thus, the first prong of the Perry test is met. See Perry, 
150 Idaho at 228. 
C. The Violation Of Mr. Baker's Constitutional Rights Is Clear And Obvious From 
The Record 
As discussed in Section I(B), supra, the district court imposed sentence "in 
consideration of the fact that [Mr. Baker] entered an Alford plea .... " (Tr., p.32, Ls.7-S.) 
As such, the district court's violation of those rights is clear from the record. This is 
because, as the Court of Appeals has recently held, "[w]hile failure to acknowledge guilt 
5 The Supreme Court specifically allowed that courts did not have to accept such guilty 
pleas. Alford, 400 U.S. at 37. In any event, Idaho recognizes the validity of Alford 
pleas. See, e.g., State v. Howry, 127 Idaho 94, 96 (Ct. App. 1995). And, although it did 
not have to, the district court did accept Mr. Baker's Alford plea in this case. (R., p.63; 
Tr., p.13, Ls.1-5.) Thus, Mr. Baker validly exercised this right, permitted by federal and 
state precedent. See, e.g., Alford, U.S. at 37; Howry, 127 Idaho at 96. 
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may indicate a lack of rehabilitative potential, maintaining a position of innocence as 
Grist has done here ... is insufficient to justify an increased sentence." Grist,_ 
Idaho _, February 24, 2012 Opinion at 9. Because all that Mr. Baker has done by 
entering an Alford plea is maintain a position of innocence,6 the district court's decision 
to impose a prison sentence based on that act is a clear and obvious violation of 
his rights. As such, the second prong of the Perry test is met. See Perry, 150 Idaho 
at 228. 
D. The District Court's Error Affected The Outcome Of The Case 
In this regard, the fact that Mr. Baker received a more excessive sentence 
because he chose to make an Alford plea demonstrates that the violation of his rights 
affected the outcome of his case. First, the presentence investigator's recommendation 
was that Mr. Childers participate in a rider program. (PSI, p.13.) Since the district court 
decided to go beyond that recommendation because Mr. Baker exercised his rights, that 
demonstrates how the district court's error affected the outcome of his case. 
Second, as will be discussed in more depth in Section /I, infra, had the district 
court engaged in a proper sentencing determination, a more lenient sentence would 
6 Mr. Baker only entered an Alford plea in regard to Count I of the Information (sexual 
battery of a minor). (Tr., p.10, L.11 - p.11, L.21; R., p.43.) He maintained that he had 
not, as the Information alleged, touch K.S.N.'s breasts, and thus, not committed sexual 
battery. (See Tr., p.10, L.18 - p.11, L.19; R. p.43.) He did, however, admit guilt in 
regard to Count /I (attempted rape) and did not contest any of the facts relating to that 
charge. (Tr., p.12, Ls.7-25.) As such, his Alford plea was only in relation to Count I. 
This also reveals that he was not unwilling to admit guilt or accept responsibility, so his 
exercise of this right has less impact than a complete refusal to admit guilt. Compare 
Grist, _ Idaho _, February 24, 2012 Opinion at 9. Thus, as the continued assertion 
of innocence was insufficient to justify Mr. Grist's more excessive sentence, it certainly 
cannot justify Mr. Baker'S more excessive sentence. See id. 
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have been appropriate.7 Therefore, the more excessive sentence will cause him to 
serve more prison time than he would have, had the district court properly considered 
the mitigating factors. As such, the district court's decision to impose a prison sentence 
"in consideration of the fact that [Mr. Baker] entered an Alford plea" affected the 
outcome of his case, causing him to serve a prison sentence as opposed to a period of 
retained jurisdiction. Thus, the third prong of the Perry test is met. See Perry, 150 
Idaho at 228. 
Because the district court committed a fundamental error and vindictively 
sentenced Mr. Baker for his decision to enter an Alford plea, this Court should vacate 
his sentence and remand for new sentencing. 
II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed Concurrent Unified 
Sentences Of Ten Years, With Two Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Baker Following His Plea 
Of Guilty To Sexual Battery Of A Minor Who Is Sixteen Or Seventeen Years Old, And 
Attempted Rape 
A. Introduction 
Should this Court find that the sentence was not vindictive, it should still reduce it 
or remand for a new sentencing hearing because the district court insufficiently 
considered various mitigating factors which justify a more lenient sentence. Mr. Baker 
was a relatively stable, law-abiding citizen for most of his adult life, only accumulating a 
few misdemeanors and traffic infractions. He worked for one employer for thirteen 
years until the lack of business led to the termination of his position. Yet, when he was 
sentenced for these crimes, the district court did not sufficiently consider that evidence 
7 For example, one of the mitigating factors was that these were Mr. Baker's first felony 
offenses, and he has a minimal criminal record otherwise. (PSI, pp.4-5.) 
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or the fact that he had accepted responsibility for his actions and was amenable to 
treatment. In doing so, it insufficiently considered Idaho's recognized sentencing 
objectives. As a result, it imposed excessive sentences in an abuse of its discretion. 
This Court should remedy these abuses. 
B. In Light Of A Sufficient Consideration Of The Sentencing Objectives And 
Mitigating Factors, The Imposed Sentences Are Excessive And Constitute An 
Abuse Of Discretion 
Mr. Baker asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentences of ten 
years, with two years fixed, are excessive. Where a defendant contends that the 
sentencing court imposed excessively harsh sentences the appellate court will conduct 
an independent review of the record, giving consideration to the nature of the offense, 
the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See 
State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771,772 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "'[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence.'" State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573,577 (1979)). Mr. Baker does not allege that his 
sentences exceed the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of 
discretion, he must show that, in light of the governing criteria, the sentences were 
excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria, or sentencing 
objectives, are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public 
generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for 
wrongdoing. Id. The protection of society is the primary objective the court should 
consider. State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993). Therefore, sentences 
10 
that protect society and also accomplishes the other objectives will be considered 
reasonable. Id.; State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982). This is because 
the protection of society is influenced by each of the other objectives, and as a result, 
each must be addressed in sentencing. Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500. 
There are several factors that the appellate court should consider to determine 
whether the objectives are served by a particular sentence. State v. Knighton, 143 
Idaho 318, 320 (2006). They include, but are not limited to: "the defendant's good 
character, status as a first-time offender, sincere expressions of remorse and 
amenability to treatment, and support of family." Id. Insufficient consideration of these 
factors has been the basis for a more lenient sentence in several cases. See, e.g., 
Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482,489-90 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 
209 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Carrasco, 114 Idaho 348,354-55 (Ct. App. 1988), rev'd on 
other grounds, 117 Idaho 295, 301 (1990); State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 
(1982). In this case, several of those factors are present, but were insufficiently 
considered by the district court as it crafted Mr. Baker's sentences, and, as a result, the 
sentences do not serve the objectives, and are excessive. 
First, Mr. Baker demonstrated his amenability for treatment. Although he was 
unable to effectively communicate the fact to the presentence investigator, he does 
not blame the victim; rather, he accepted responsibility for his actions.8 (Tr., p.19, 
Ls.12-19.) By acknowledging his guilt and accepting responsibility, he has taken the 
critical first steps toward rehabilitation. See State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 812,815 (Ct. App. 
2010), rev. denied. 
8 Although he only admitted guilt to one of these offenses, he accepted responsibility for 
both. (See Tr., p.19, Ls.12-19; PSI, p.13.) 
11 
Additiona"y, he has demonstrated several redeeming character traits during 
these proceedings. For example, although he was not incarcerated during these 
proceedings, he appeared for a" his appointments and court proceedings. (Tr., p.26, 
L.24 - p.27, L.3; PSI, p.49.) He was also cooperative during the required evaluations. 
(See PSI, p.32.) He was truthful on his polygraph examination, which determined 
this was his only victim. (PSI, p.37.) Cooperation with authorities is a fact the courts 
should consider in mitigation. See State v. Ybarra, 122 Idaho 11, 16 (Ct. App. 1992) 
(considering the fact that the defendant was unwilling to cooperate until after he was 
sentenced as a character trait which indicated no relief was justified). 
Furthermore, he was amenable to treatment. The advice from Dr. Wert - that 
Mr. Baker suffered from dementia, and so treatment would be largely ineffective - was 
inaccurate. The tests performed by Dr. Wolfe (specifically aimed at diagnosing 
dementia) revealed that the more correct diagnosis was a cognitive disorder, NOS, 
secondary to his brain injury. (PSI, p.56.) The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized 
that Idaho Code § 19-2523 not only suggests, but requires, the trial court to consider 
a defendant's mental condition as a sentencing factor. Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 
581 (1999). In that regard, the more appropriate diagnosis, based on the more targeted 
tests, revealed that Mr. Baker could effectively participate in rehabilitative programs, so 
long as some accommodations were provided, as particular rehabilitative techniques 
would be more effective for him. (PSI, pp.56-57.) Dr. Wolfe recognized that with the aid 
some of these techniques, Mr. Baker would struggle, but that did not preclude the 
potential for all treatment. (PSI, p.57.) Therefore, while Dr. Wert's perspective was not 
wholly incorrect, it was not the most accurate representation of Mr. Baker's rehabilitative 
potential. A sufficient consideration of Mr. Baker's mental condition reveals that he is 
12 
capable of rehabilitating. Therefore, a sufficient consideration of Mr. Baker's character 
reveals that he is not only amenable to such treatment, but cooperative in similar 
situations. Both of these factors indicate a more lenient sentence would be appropriate. 
Compare, e.g., Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595. 
The Court of Appeals has also specifically recognized that, "[f]or someone with a 
relatively stable background who had apparently spent the majority of his adult years 
as a law-abiding citizen, it is certainly reasonable to believe that a lesser term of 
incarceration ... would be sufficient to [address all four sentencing objectives]." Cook, 
145 Idaho at 489. Similarly, Mr. Baker had a relatively stable background. He worked 
for the same employer for some thirteen years before the company was forced to lay 
him off due to lack of business. (PSI, pp.9-10.) Had the company been able to support 
his position, it is likely that he would still be working there. (PSI, p.56.) He also has 
spent the majority of his adult years as a law-abiding citizen. 9 These are his first felony 
offenses. (PSI, ppA-5.) Otherwise, he only has a few misdemeanor offenses, a 
parole/probation violation, and some traffic infractions on his record. (PSI, ppA-5.) 
The fact that these are his first felony offenses also deserves particular 
consideration. The Idaho Supreme Court has "recognized that the first offender should 
be accorded more lenient treatment than the habitual crimina!." Shideler, 103 Idaho at 
595, (quoting State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402 (1953), overruled on other grounds by 
State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227,228 (1971)). This is because such a person does not 
yet have a fixed character for crime and so rehabilitation at this point is more likely. 
Owen, 73 Idaho at 402. Therefore, since these are Mr. Baker's first felonies and he is 
not a habitual offender, the time to employ rehabilitative options is now. As a result, a 
9 Mr. Baker was 35 years old at the time of sentencing. (PSI, p.1.) 
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more lenient sentence, such as a period of retained jurisdiction, which provides such a 
rehabilitative opportunity, should have been imposed. 
The district court's idea of a treatment opportunity, however, was to impose a 
longer sentence so that Mr. Baker would have plenty of time to participate in 
rehabilitative programs. (See Tr., p.32, Ls.13-19.) This was improper for several 
reasons. First, the United States Supreme Court has recently found this perspective 
untenable. See Tapia v. United States., 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2388-89 (2011) (interpreting 
U.S.C. § 3582(a)). That Court held that, because sentencing courts could only 
recommend, but not require, participation in prison rehabilitative programs, they were 
precluded from imposing or lengthening a prison term (as the district court did in this 
case) for the purpose of promoting the offender's rehabilitation. Id. at 2390-91. Idaho 
courts are similarly limited. See, e.g., State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726 (2007) 
(quoting State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007), "whether or not a defendant 
serves longer than the fixed portion of the sentence is a matter left to the sole discretion 
of the parole board, and '[c]ourts cannot intrude on this discretion when fashioning 
a sentence nor when reviewing a sentence[.]",).10 Therefore, the district court's 
decision to impose a prison sentence simply to provide more time for participation in the 
prison's rehabilitative programs was in error. See Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2388-91; Oliver, 
144 Idaho at 726. 
Furthermore, the district court noted that the prison programming might include 
sex offender treatment, implying that such an opportunity was not assured. (Tr., p.32, 
Ls.15-17.) It also informed Mr. Baker that he "will become eligible for programming," 
10 The inference from these holdings is that the courts are powerless to enforce any 
determinations as to whether a defendant must complete a certain rehabilitative 
program before he is eligible for release. 
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which indicates that his rehabilitation will be delayed. (Tr., p.32, L.15.) These 
considerations by the district court are particularly disconcerting because the Idaho 
Supreme Court has realized that timing is an important consideration when addressing 
rehabilitation. See Owen, 73 Idaho at 402; State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982). 
The Court of Appeals has also continued to recognize that timely and effective 
rehabilitation justifies lesser prison sentences. See, e.g., Cook, 145 Idaho at 489; 
State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635, 639 (Ct. App. 1988). Delaying rehabilitation is 
inappropriate because sentences are to be crafted so that they do not force the prison 
system to continue detaining a person once rehabilitation or age has decreased the risk 
of recidivism. Id. By delaying (or potentially denying) his rehabilitative opportunities, 
Mr. Baker's sentence operates contrary to the admonitions from Cook and Eubank. As 
such, Mr. Baker's sentence is excessive and was imposed in an abuse of the district 
court's discretion. 
A sufficient examination of all these mitigating factors reveals that a more 
lenient sentence, one aimed at rehabilitation, also addresses all the other sentencing 
objectives - protection of society, punishment, and deterrence. See State v. Ransom, 
124 Idaho 703, 713 (1993) (requiring that alternative sentences still address all the 
sentencing objectives). As previously noted, "[f]or someone with a relatively stable 
background who had apparently spent the majority of his adult years as a law-abiding 
citizen, it is certainly reasonable to believe that a lesser term of incarceration ... would 
be sufficient to [address all four sentencing objectives]." Cook, 145 Idaho at 489. 
Additionally, when a sentencing court retains jurisdiction, 11 it still imposes and executes 
11 Both the presentence investigator and defense counsel recommended that the district 
court retain jurisdiction in this case. (PSI, p.13; Tr., p.29, L.25 - p.30, L.1.) 
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a sentence. Therefore, both the retributive and the deterrent effects of the imposed 
sentence are still present. See State v. Crockett, 146 Idaho 13, 14-15 (Ct. App. 2008), 
(discussing how even a sentence for a period of probation addresses a" the sentencing 
objectives and how the role that a court's continuing jurisdiction affects those 
objectives). Such a sentence punishes Mr. Baker by depriving him not only of his liberty 
for that period of time, but several of his rights (such as the right to possess a firearm) 
as we", since these were felony offenses. These results, along with the imposed 
sentences, also serve as a deterrent against society at large. Furthermore, it deters 
Mr. Baker specifically because the sentence need not be suspended should he perform 
poorly or otherwise violate the terms of the rider. Even if he completes the rider and is 
placed on probation, the looming sentence still deters him from violating his probation. 
In this case, the district court does not lose anything in terms of protection of 
society, deterrence, or punishment by retaining jurisdiction. Society receives equally 
similar protection during the period of retained jurisdiction as it does by incarcerating 
him. Mr. Baker is in the custody of the Department of Correction either way. He cannot 
harm society during that period, so society is protected whether he is on a rider or 
in prison. Furthermore, Mr. Baker does not present a significant risk to society. On his 
STATIC-99 test, he scored a 2 of 12, which puts him in the low-moderate range to 
reoffend. (PSI, p.38.) He also performed well while released in the pretrial stages of 
these proceedings. (Tr. p.27, Ls.3-8.) Therefore, the fact that he does not present a 
significant risk to society justifies a more lenient sentence. See Cook, 145 Idaho at 489; 
Eubank, 114 Idaho at 639. However, the district court would also retain the ability to 
leave Mr. Baker incarcerated for the entire fixed term of the sentence if he did not show 
progress on the rider. And if the district court did that, the Parole Board has broad 
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discretion over whether to release him on parole during the indeterminate term of 
his sentence. See State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 931 (200S). The only difference 
between that result and the currently-imposed sentence is that the district court could 
relinquish jurisdiction knowing that all the sentencing objectives properly addressed. 
What the period of retained jurisdiction provides that the prison sentence does 
not is the opportunity to rehabilitate now, and as the Idaho Supreme Court has noted, 
rehabilitation is more likely now than in the future. See, e.g., Owen, 73 Idaho at 402. 
Finally, that sentence would follow the presentence investigator's recommendation, 
which was that Mr. Baker be sent to the Traditional Retained Jurisdiction Program 
because it would provide him with programs designed to help him address his sexual 
behavior issues, as well as his general criminal issues, in a controlled environment. 
(PSI, p.13.) This differs from the prison rehabilitative programs, which only might 
include specific sexual behavior courses. (See Tr., p.32, Ls.1S-17.) 
Therefore, because the district court insufficiently considered these mitigating 
factors, it imposed excessive sentences in an abuse of its discretion. This Court should 
remedy that abuse. 
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CONCLUSION 
Because the district court imposed a vindictive sentence, Mr. Baker respectfully 
requests that this Court vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing. 
Otherwise, because the district court insufficiently considered the mitigating 
factors present in his case, Mr. Baker respectfully requests that this Court reduce his 
sentences as it deems appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his case be 
remanded to the district court for a new sentencing hearing. 
DATED this 21 st day of March, 2012. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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